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(Utah 1991).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Rex D. Powell appeals from the July 9, 2002, judgment, sentence and commitment

of the Fourth District Court after a returned verdict of guilty to the charge of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony, enhanced based on prior
convictions and Driving on a Revoked License.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Mr. Powell was charged by information filed in the Fourth District Court with

Driving Under the Influence with Prior Convictions, a third degree felony, on or about
December 29, 2001, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 and Driving on a
Suspended or Revoked operator's license, a Class Misdemeanor, in violation of § 53-3227. (R. 24).
On April 16, 2002, at the preliminary hearing, the trial court found probable cause
exists on both counts. (R. 171). On April 23, 2002, Mr. Powell entered pleas of not guilty.
(R. 31). June 12, 2002, a bifurcated jury trial was conducted. (R. 175). For the first part of
the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of Driving Under the Influence
2

and Driving on a Revoked License. (R. 173). Thereafter, Mr. Powell waived his right to a
jury trial and submitted himself to trial by the court on the remaining issue of whether the
State was justified in enhancing the conviction to a Third Degree Felony based on the
alleged prior convictions. (R. 175). Thereafter, the State offered certified copies of two
Judgments as evidence of two prior convictions entered against Mr. Powell.(R. 175).
The first prior conviction was case number 965008568, dated December 12, 1996,
in the Orem City Department of the Fourth Judicial District Court, entitled Orem City v.
Rex D. Powell, noting a conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs,
based on a plea of guilty. The second prior conviction offered was case number
995300016, dated June 28, 1999, in the Spanish Fork City Department of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, entitled Spanish Fork City v. Rex D. Powell, noting a conviction
for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, also based on a plea of guilty. (R. 174175).
Mr. Powell objected to the admission of evidence of these two prior convictions,
arguing that neither of the two convictions was supported by evidence of a knowing and
voluntary plea of guilty. Based on the stipulation of the parties, the court allowed the
parties to file briefs addressing this issue. (R. 175). On July 3, 2002, Oral Argument
occurred where defense counsel preserved the issue for the record. (R. 169). The court,
after reviewing the motion to exclude the evidence, denied the motion. (R. 136). The
ruling of the trial court can be found on pages 136-143 of the Record. Subsequently, on
July 3, 2002, the trial court found Mr. Powell guilty to the charge of Driving Under the
3

Influence, a Third Degree Felony, reasoning that the trial courts in the two priors were not
in error and Mr. Powell did enter pleas of guilty voluntarily and knowingly. (R. 136).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On or about December 29, 2001, Mr. Powell was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol with prior convictions. (R. 2). To enhance the present offense to a
Third Degree Felony, the state relied on Fourth District Court Case No. 965008568 and
Fourth Judicial District Court Case No. 995300016. (R. 174).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Powell's prior convictions could be
admitted into evidence for enhancement purposes because each of those prior convictions
was a result of an involuntary guilty plea. Rule 11 mandates that the trial judge comply
with Rule 11 to ensure the defendant understands what rights he or she waives when
entering a plea of guilty, regardless of whether defendant's counsel informed and
explained to the defendant the rights he or she would waive when entering a plea of
guilty.
Mr. Powell plead not guilty to a DUI charge where the trial judge initially
explained Rule 11 to Mr. Powell. Later, Mr. Powell was assigned counsel and was then
brought before the judge and plead that he was guilty. At that time, the trial judge in no
way explained what rights were being waived. In effect, Mr. Powell's guilty plea was
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involuntary.
In a subsequent pleading, Mr. Powell plead guilty although the judge did not read
or explain Rule 11. Therefore, because both prior convictions were a result of involuntary
pleas of guilty, the State cannot use those prior conviction to enhance the current charge
of DUI. Therefore, the court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to exclude the
evidence of the prior conviction for enhancement purposes.
In addition, the weight of the evidence in light most favorable of the verdict does
not support a conclusion that Mr. Powell had committed a DUI on driving on a revoked
license.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT PRIOR
CONVICTIONS WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMPLETELY
COMPLY WITH RULE 11 CAN QUALIFY AS VOLUNTARY GUILTY
PLEAS THAT CAN BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENHANCING THE
CURRENT DUI CONVICTION TO A THIRD DEGREE FELONY.
The trial court's denial of Mr. Powell's motion to exclude evidence of prior DUI

convictions for enhancement purposes should be reversed as a matter of law. In each of
Mr. Powell's prior convictions for DUI, the court failed to comply with the requirements
of Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and accordingly the pleas were
not entered voluntarily as required by Utah law.
"An involuntary guilty plea cannot be used to enhance or support a subsequent
conviction." State v. Branch 743 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S.
5

1036, 108 S.Ct. 1597 (1988). The court has a mandatory duty to explain several distinct
aspects and consequences of pleading guilty before a court may validly accept a guilty
plea. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court must make sure that the
defendant knows and understands the following: (i) the basic constitutional rights that he
waives by pleading guilty, see Id. (e) (3); (ii) what he is pleading guilty to and the
elements the prosecution must prove at trial, see Id. (e) (4); (iii) the potential penalty
should he plead guilty, see Id. (e) (5); (iv) the time limit for withdrawing his plea, see Id.
(e) (7); and (v) that his right to appeal is limited, see Id. (e) (8).
However, once a guilty plea is entered on the merits, Utah courts recognize a
strong presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,
82 (Utah App. 1990). When the State seeks to enhance a charge, it bears the burden of
proving the prior conviction. State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). "After the
proof of the previous conviction [or convictions] is introduced, the burden is on the
defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she . . . did not
knowingly waive counsel [or did not voluntarily enter a plea of guilt]." Id. It is the
defendant who is in the best situation to know and demonstrate that his or her pleas were
involuntarily made. Id.
Once the defendant produces some evidence that he did not voluntarily enter a plea
of guilt, the court must evaluate whether the defendant knowingly waived his or her
rights. Id. Mr. Powell asserts that he presented some evidence of involuntariness in the
two prior convictions when he enter a plea of guilt. There is indication in the record that
6

neither Judge Dimick in the Orem City Court nor Judge Maetani in the Spanish Fork City
Court completely followed the mandates of Rule 11 when they accepted Mr. Powell's
guilty pleas.

A.

The trial court erred in concluding that the 1996 conviction in the Fourth
Judicial District Court satisfied the requirements under Rule 11(e) of Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In December of 1996, Fourth District Court Case No. 965008568, Mr. Powell

entered a plea of guilty. However, despite representation, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that the constitutional requirements of Rule 11(e) had been satisfied.
The law places a burden upon a trial judge to fully comply with Rule 11(e). State
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the
burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with
when a guilty plea is entered. The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). Under the
strict compliance test, before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court must review on the
record with the defendant at the time the plea is taken the nature and elements of the
offense, the constitutional rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives by pleading
guilty, and the allowable penalties." State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 22 f 10, 996 P.2d
1065, affirm9d2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 (internal citations omitted).
Though the record from the Orem City trial court indicates that Judge Dimick
complied with Rule 11(e) to some degree, he failed to completely comply with Rule
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11(e).1 Rule 11(e) expressly mandates that "[t]he c o u r t . . . may not accept a guilty plea
until the court has found" all of the requirements fo Rule 11(e). Utah R. Crim. Proa, Rule
11(e). During Mr. Powell's first discourse with Judge Dimick, the court explained the
charge Mr. Powell was facing and somewhat explained the elements that the prosecution
would need to prove at trial-this satisfied Rule 11(e) (4). Judge Dimick similarly
complied with Rule 11(e) (5) by explaining the potential sentences that Mr. Powell could
be exposed to upon pleading guilty. However, Judge Dimick failed to inform Mr. Powell
of the important constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty as Rule 11(e) (3)
require. Moreover, Judge Dimick did not explain the time limit for withdrawing a plea or
that Mr. Powell's right to appeal would be limited as Rule 11(e) (7-8) requires. However,
as a result of this discourse, Mr. Powell entered a plea of not guilty.
After having counsel appointed to him and meeting with counsel, Mr. Powell
changed his plea from not guility to guilty before Judge Dimick. The colloquy of the first
discourse could not be construed to meet any of the requirements fo Rule 11 because
Judge Dimick did not completely comply with Rule 11(e) initially. Therefore, Judge
Dimick did not validly accept Mr. Powell's guilty plea because Judge Dimick failed to
make any inquiry into whether Mr. Powell understood the rest of the requirements of

*In his MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, Defendant proffered transcribed portions of Defendant's appearances
for entry of plea in each of his prior DUI convictions (R. 103-110). In its RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, the State impliedly accepted
Defendant's representation of the record of each of Defendant's plea appearances in his prior
DUI convictions (R.121). Copies of each transcript are attached hereto as an addendum.
8

Rule 11(e).
Because Judge Dimick failed to fully comply with Rule 11(e) during the first
discourse with Mr. Powell, which resulted in a plea of not guilty, and in the subsequent
discourse with Mr. Powell Judge Dimick did not explain any of Rule 11 to Mr. Powell,
Mr. Powell asserts that these circumstances compound the error of the court and weigh in
favor of a finding that Mr. Powell's plea in the Orem City Court was not established as
either knowingly or voluntarily entered.

B.

The trial court erred in concluding that because Mr. Powell's attorney had
explained to him his rights, requirements of Rule 11(e) of Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure were satisfied.
In February of 1999, Fourth Judicial District Court Case No. 995300016, Mr.

Powell entered a plea of guilt. However, despite representation, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that the constitutional requirements of Rule 11(e) had been satisfied.
The court in Gibbons rejected the argument that Rule 11(e) was met because a
defendant's attorney had explained the defendant's rights. The court reasoned that "[i]t is
too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be entered against a defendant solely on the
consent of the defendant's agent-his lawyer... . [T]he choice to plead guilty must be the
defendant's: it is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea and what it is
that he waives when he pleads." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. (Quoting Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976)).
The record from the Spanish Fork City Court demonstrates that Judge Maetani
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failed to adequately comply with Rule 11(e) when he accepted Mr. Powell's guilty plea.2
During that discourse with Mr. Powell, Judge Maetani made no effort to explain what is
required by Rule 11(e). Although Mr. Powell's attorney had explained to him his rights,
the obligation to comply with Rule 11(e) rested solely with Judge Maetani. Anything that
Mr. Powell's counsel may have explained is immaterial in this regard. Therefore, the
guilty plea made before Judge Maetani also failed to comply with the mandates of Rule
11(e).
Because neither of Mr. Powell's prior guilty pleas complied with Rule 11(e),
evidence of neither should have been admitted to be used to enhance the degree of the
crime. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "an involuntary guilty plea cannot be
used to enhance or support a subsequent conviction." Branch, 743 P.2d at 1192.

IL

THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND DRIVING ON
A REVOKED LICENSED IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Mr. Powell's conviction for Driving Under the Influence, a Third Degree Felony,

was clearly erroneous because the evidence , when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, did not support the verdict of guilty. The Prosecution did put forth evidence
that Mr. Powell was intoxicate the night of his arrest, however, the evidence does not
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Powell had been driving or had the
capability to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Therefore,

2

See footnote #1.
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when viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support that verdict.
"To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the
one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991).
In cases where the State is seeking to charge an individual for driving under the
influence of alcohol as well as driving on a revoked license it must present evidence
showing that the individual had "actual physical control" of the vehicle. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44 (1987); Utah Code Ann. § 53-3- 220 (2002); State v. Nuttall, 611 P.2d
722 (Utah 1980); Hess v. Blackstock, 65 P.3d 305 (Utah App. 2003).
In the instant case it is clear that Mr. Powell had been intoxicated at the time police
had arrested him. It is also clear that at the time, Mr. Powell's license had been revoked.
Trial Transcript, P. 84, L. 4). However, it is not clear that the individual operating the
vehicle was Mr. Powell.
The State presented evidence through three witnesses. The first witness was Mrs.
Baxley who testified she observed a truck pull into her driveway. (Trial Transcript, P. 53,
L. 22-25). She also had observed a man get out of the truck and walk towards her house.
(Tr., P. 54, L. 5-6). She noticed that the man appeared disoriented, staggering. (Tr., P. 54,
L. 7, 10).
Mrs. Baxley informed her husband of the man approaching the house. (Tr., P. 54,
11

L. 12).
Her husband instructed her to call 9-1-1, which she did and then handed her husband the
phone. (Tr., P. 54, L. 21-23 and P. 55, L. 1). Mrs. Baxley then observed the man converse
with her husband and then get back into his truck, back out of the driveway and head
north and drive into the neighbor's driveway. (Tr., P. 55, L. 10-18). On cross, Mrs.
Baxely clarified that the truck did in fact drive on the public highway that leads from her
home to the neighbor's driveway. (Tr., P. 59, L. 2).
The State then called Mr. Baxley to the stand. He testified that he observed a truck
was parked in his driveway after his wife informed him that they had company. (Tr., P.
61, L. 25). Mr. Baxley saw an individual get out of the driver's side of the vehicle and
approach the house. (Tr., P. 61, L. 25 and P. 67, L. 7-8). Immediately Mr. Baxley went to
the front door to confront the man. (Tr., P. 61, L. 25). Mr. Baxely then opened the front
door and saw a man heading down the stairs to the downstairs entrance. (Tr., P. 62, L. 34). He then ask the man if he could help him, but the man responded with a name, "Butch
Walker." (Tr., P. 62, L. 6-7). Mr. Baxley then testified that at that time he told the man he
didn't know of anyone by that name but that his neighbors were called the Walkers. (Tr.,
P. 62, L. 7-8). Mr. Baxley had noticed that the man's voice was slurred. (Tr., P. 62, L.
11). Mr. Baxley then identified Mr. Powell as the man he saw the night in question who
appeared to be impaired. (Tr., P. 62, L. 12-20).
Mr. Baxley had his wife call 9-1-1 and hand him the phone when the truck began
to back out of the driveway and onto the public road. (Tr., P. 63, L. 13-14, 17). While on
12

the phone with police dispatch and as he maintained eye contact with the vehicle, Mr.
Baxley informed dispatch of the events as they occurred—from the time the truck backed
out from the Baxley's driveway onto the public road to the time the truck entered the
Walkers' driveway and the man exited the vehicle. (Tr., P. 63, LI7-19 and P. 65, L. 1119). Mr. Baxley then observed the man walk up to the front door of the neighbor's house
and knock. (Tr., P. 64, L. 8-10). Mr. Baxley then observed the man return to his vehicle
and get in at which time police arrived to the scene. (Tr., P. 65, L. 4-5).
On cross, Mr. Baxley testified that there was nothing in his yard that would
prevent him from seeing the street nor his neighbor's driveway and porch. (Tr., P. 69, L.
3-19). He also clarified that the same man who was climbing down the stairs of his house
was the same man he saw enter the vehicle on the driver's side. (Tr. P. 71-72, L. 24-25
and 1).
Finally, the State called as its final witness Officer Theron Leany. After qualifying
the witness as a certified Drug Recognition Expert and one who is certified to operate the
chemical breath test machine (Intoxilyzer 5000), Officer Leany testified that he was
receiving direction from police dispatch who was in contact with Mr. Baxley. (Tr., P. 79,
L. 17-21). Dispatch had informed Officer Leany that the vehicle had left the
complainant's address and had driven to the neighbor's to the north of the complainant.
(Tr., P. 80, L. 4-8). When Officer Leany arrived to the neighbor's residence, he notice a
Ford pickup truck parked in the driveway with only one individual in the driver's seat.
(Tr., P. 80, L. 8-18). At that point, Officer Leany noticed tire tracks in the fresh snow
13

leading from the Baxley's driveway to the current location of the parked truck in the
neighbor's driveway. (Tr., P. 81, L. 1-3). He also noticed that there was one set of
footprints that led from the driver's side of the truck to the front door of the neighbor's
home and back again to the truck. (Tr., P. 81, L. 5-7). Officer Leany then identified Mr.
Powell as the man who was in the vehicle that evening. (Tr., P. 81, L. 21-23).
Officer Leany then spoke with Mr. Powell and noticed that his breath emitted a
strong odor of alcohol and that his speech was slurred and lethargic. (Tr., P. 81, L. 21-23
and P. 82, L. 5). Officer Leany then placed Mr. Powell under arrest and transported him
to the Orem City Jail where he performed an Intoxilyzer test, booked, and process him.
(Tr., P. 83, L. 13-16; P. 85, L. 5-9; P. 86-87, L. 16-25, 1-10). At that time, Officer Leany
discovered that Mr. Powell had a revoked license. (Tr., P. 83, L. 22-23). The State
produce evidence of Mr. Powell's driving record indicating that Mr. Powell's license had
been revoked. (Tr., P. 84, L. 4).
Before performing the Intoxilyzer test to Mr. Powell and to ensure an accurate
reading, Officer Leany checked that Mr. Powell did not have anything in his mouth that
would retain alcohol, that he did not eat or drink anything, and that he did not burp while
administering the test. (Tr., P. 87, L. 12-23 and P. 88, L. 1). The result of the breath test
was printed out on a report card which read that Mr. Powell had a breath alcohol level of
.341. (Tr., P. 92, L. 18). At this point, the State rest its case.
Mr. Powell then took the stand and testified that he had spoken to Officer Leany
the night he was arrested. (Tr., P. 103, L. 15-18). Mr. Powell also conceded that he knew
14

he was intoxicated the night in question. (Tr., P. 107, L. 6-8). After Mr. Powell's
testimony, the defense rest its case.
The State recalled to the stand Officer Leany as a rebuttal witness. Officer Leany
clarified that he remembers only one set of tire tracks leading from the Baxley's driveway
to the back of the Mr. Powell's vehicle where he had found the defendant sitting in the
driver's seat the night in question. (Tr., P. 111, L. 9-20). Officer Leany also clarified that
there was no sign of anyone else being present prior to the police arriving to the scene.
(Tr., P. I l l , L. 21-24). Officer Leany finally clarified that there was only one set of
footprints around the Mr. Powell's vehicle. (Tr., P. 112, L. 17-18).
It is clear in this case that the State had the burden of showing that Mr. Powell had
"actual physical control" of his vehicle and that he was under the influence of alcohol at
the time he had that control. Although Mr. Powell conceded that he was indeed
intoxicated the evening he was arrested and charge with Driving Under the Influence and
Driving with a Revoked License, the evidence is not sufficient to support a verdict that
Mr. Powell had "actual physical control" of his vehicle at that time. No one testified they
actually saw Mr. Powell drive the truck into the driveway of the Baxleys.
The evidence indicates that Mr. Powell only climbed in and out of his truck. It
cannot be certain that there were no other persons in the vehicle at the time he climbed
out of the vehicle and then back in when the vehicle drove over to the neighbor's
driveway. Mr. Powell had told police that a friend drove him and that he didn't drive.
(Tr., P., L.) Mr. Powell testified that it was his son who drove him and then left him there
15

alone. (Tr., P., L.) It is possible that Mr. Baxley was concentrating solely on placing the
9-1-1 call that he did not see clearly who was driving the truck. Mr. Baxley was focused
on Mr. Powell and nothing else. Therefore, in light most favorable to the support of the
verdict, the evidence is lacking in a showing beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Powell
was the one in physical control of the truck from the time the truck pulled up into the
Baxely's driveway to the time the vehicle backed out of the Baxley's driveway and
entered the Walkers' driveway. Therefore, the jury verdict is clearly erroneous and Mr.
Powell's DUI and Driving with a Revoked License conviction should be reversed.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Rex D. Powell asks that this Court reverse the judgment
of the trial court in regards to the DUI conviction and order that this matter be remanded
to the Fourth Judicial District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of May, 2003,

Thomas Means
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hearby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this l| t h day of May, 2003.
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Page 1
UTRRCRPRulell
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11

c
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Copr © West Group 2002 All rights reserved
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002

RULE 11 PLEAS

(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant
waives counsel in open court The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time
to confer with counsel
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill
A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial A defendant unable to make
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel,
(2) the plea is voluntarily made,
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine m open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived,
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements,
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction,
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences,
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached,
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(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure
of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.

[Amended effective January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.]

Rules Crim. Proc, Rule 11
UTRRCRPRule 11
END OF DOCUMENT
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U T ST §41-6-44
U.C.A. 1953 §41-6-44

c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 41, MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration --Measurement of blood or
breath alcohol --Criminal punishment --Arrest without warrant -- Penalties
--Suspension or revocation of license.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under
Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is
taken illegally in the body;
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination
of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (1)(a)(i) through
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or

(v), which judgment of

(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any
district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a
violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments administered
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in
accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency
screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by
the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section
62A-15-105;
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(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in
accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse
program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6- 43; and
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person
exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
time of operation or actual physical control.

.08 grams or greater at the

(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of
violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per
100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection
(2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;

(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense;
or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction,
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 4 8 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in
accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home
confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not
order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the
substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is
appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of
.16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14) .
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior
conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 24 0 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in
accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home
confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not
order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5) (d) ; and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the
substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is
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appropriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection
(14) .
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection
it is :

(2) is a third degree felony if

(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or
more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:

(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001;
or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this
section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the
person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a
substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment
and long-term closely supervised follow-through after treatment for not less than
24 0 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court
orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include
requiring the person to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any
sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole resulting
from a conviction for a violation under this section may not be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening and
assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion of the court,
substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or do a
combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and assessment, an
educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second,
or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as
the court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second,
or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
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(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to:
(i) complete all court ordered:
(A) screening and assessment;
(B) educational series;
(C) substance abuse treatment; and
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs.
Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving
privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section
41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in
connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in
connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under
this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of
Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first
time under Subsection (2) ;
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense
under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined under
Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of ten years from the
date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under
Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section
53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence
upon which the record of conviction is based.

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 6
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may
order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days,
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons who have
shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection
(12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to
suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through
the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the
appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or
contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person,
so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified
location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance
abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the
person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend
school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between those
activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person
is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring
agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the
court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection
(4) (e) or (5) (e) :
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii)the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
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(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract
with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection
person's compliance with all conditions of the person's
probation, and court orders received under this article
of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence
orders.

(14)(b) shall monitor the
sentence, conditions of
and shall notify the court
or those conditions or

(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection
waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).

(14)(b) shall cover the costs of

(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, then
if the court does not order:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d),
court shall enter the reasons on the record; and

(5)(d), or

(6)(d), then the

(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record:
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for
the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in
accordance with Subsection (13).

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch.
75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, §
1; 1981, ch. 63, § 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. 103, § 1;
1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, § 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29;
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.),
ch. 8, § 2; 1988, ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183,
§ 16; 1990, ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, § 1; 1993, ch. 193, §
1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996, ch. 71, § 1;
1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223, § 2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998,
Ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 33, § 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch.
258, § 1; 2000, ch. 333, § 1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001, ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289,
§ 1; 2001, ch. 309, § 1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1; 2002, ch. 8, § 1; 2002, ch. 54, § 1;
2002, ch. 106, § 1; 2002 (5th S . S . ) , ch. 8, § 10.

U.C.A. 1953 § 41-6-44
UT ST § 41-6-44
END OF DOCUMENT
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UT LEGIS 72 (2003)
2003 Utah Laws Ch. 72 (S.B. 163)
UTAH 2003 SESSION LAWS
55th LEGISLATURE, 2003 GENERAL SESSION
Copr.

@

West Group 2003.

All rights reserved-

Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Ch. 72 (S.B. 163)
WEST'S NO. 334
DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION REQUIREMENTS

This act modifies the Public Safety Code by amending the mandatory revocation or
mandatory denial, suspension, or disqualification provisions to require a license to
be revoked, denied, suspended, or disqualified only if a person is convicted of a
felony under the motor vehicle laws rather than if the offense is punishable as a
felony under the motor vehicle laws. This act also modifies the mandatory denial,
suspension, or disqualification provisions to require suspension for any other
felony conviction only if the motor vehicle
is used to facilitate the offense.
This act makes technical changes.

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:

AMENDS:

53-3-220, as last amended by Chapter 213, Laws of Utah 1998

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 53-3-220 is amended to read:

<< UT ST § 53-3-220 >>

§ 53-3-22 0. Offenses requiring mandatory revocation, denial, suspension, or
disqualification of license--Offense requiring an extension of period-- Hearing-Limited driving privileges.

(1)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or, when this chapter or Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, specifically provides for denial,
suspension, or disqualification, the division shall deny, suspend, or disqualify the
license of a person upon receiving a record of his conviction for any of the
following offenses:
(i) manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from driving a motor vehicle, or
automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207;
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(ii) driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of them to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle as prohibited in Section 41-6-44
or as prohibited in an ordinance that complies with the requirements of Subsection
41-6-43 (1) ;
(iii) driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content prohibited in Section 41-6-44 or as prohibited in an
ordinance that complies with the requirements of Subsection 41-6-43(1);
(iv) perjury or the making of a false affidavit to the division under this chapter,
Title 41, Motor Vehicles, or any other law of this state requiring the registration
of motor vehicles or regulating driving on highways;
(v) any offense punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of this state;
(vi) any other felony in which a motor vehicle is used to facilitate ^he??orfens^;
(vii) failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state if a
motor vehicle accident results in the death or personal injury of another;
(viii) two charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months;
if upon a first conviction of reckless driving the judge or justice recommends
suspension of the convicted person's license, the division may after a hearing
suspend the license for a period of three months;

but

(ix) failure to bring a motor vehicle to a stop at the command of a peace officer
as required in Section 41-6-13.5;
(x) any offense specified in Part 4 of this chapter that requires disqualification;
(xi) discharging or allowing the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in violation
of Subsection 76-10-508(2);
(xii) using, allowing the use of, or causing to be used any explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device from a vehicle in violation of Subsection 76-10- 306(4) (b);
(xiii) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance
in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6; and
(xiv) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
any alcohol in the person's body in violation of Section 53-3-232.
(b) The division shall immediately revoke the license of a person upon receiving a
record of an adjudication under Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, for any of
the following offenses:
(i) discharging or allowing the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in violation
of Subsection 76-10-508(2);
and
(ii) using, allowing the use of, or causing to be used any explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device from a vehicle in violation of Subsection 76-10- 306(4) (b) .
(c) Except when action is taken under Section 53-3-219 for the same offense, the
division shall immediately suspend for six months the license of a person upon
receiving a record of conviction for any of the following offenses:
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(i) any violation of:
(A) Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act;
(B) Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act;
(C) Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(D) Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act;
(E) Title 58, Chapter 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act;

or

or

(ii) any criminal offense that prohibits:
(A) possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, sale, or transfer of any
substance that is prohibited under the acts described in Subsection
(\) (c) (i) ,* or
(B) the attempt or conspiracy to possess, distribute, manufacture, cultivate, sell,
or transfer any substance that is prohibited under the acts described in Subsection
|l) (c) (i) .
(2) The division shall extend the period of the first denial, suspension,
revocation, or disqualification for an additional like period, to a maximum of one
year, upon receiving:
(a) a record of the conviction of any person on a charge of driving a motor vehicle
while the person's license is denied, suspended, revoked, or disqualified;
(b) a record of a conviction of the person for any violation of the motor vehicle
law in which the person was involved as a driver;
(c) a report of an arrest of the person for any violation of the motor vehicle law
in which the person was involved as a driver;
or
(d) a report of an accident in which the person was involved as a driver.
(3) When the division receives a report under Subsection (2)(c) or (d) that a
person is driving while the person's license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked, the person is entitled to a hearing regarding the extension of the time of
denial, suspension, disqualification, or revocation originally imposed under Section
53-3-221.
(4)(a) The division may extend to a person the limited privilege of driving a motor
vehicle to and from the person's place of employment or within other specified
limits on recommendation of the trial judge in any case where a person is convicted
of any of the offenses referred to in Subsections (1) and (2) except:
(i) automobile homicide under Subsection

(1)(a)(i);

(ii) those offenses referred to in Subsections
(a) (xii) , (a)(xiii), (1) (b) , and (1) (c) ; and

(1) (a) (ii),

(a) (iii),

(a) (xi),

(iii) those offenses referred to in Subsection (2) when the original denial,
suspension, revocation, or disqualification was imposed because of a violation of
Section 41-6-44, Section 41-6-44.6, a local ordinance which complies with the
requirements of Subsection 41-6-43(1), Section 41-6-44.10, or Section 76-5- 207, or
a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of
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these sections or ordinances.
(b) This discretionary privilege is limitedto when undue hardship would result from
a failure to grant the privilege and may be granted only once to any individual
during any single period of denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification, or
extension of that denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification.
(c) A limited CDL may not be granted to an individual disqualified under Part 4 o £
this chapter. Uniform Coiwnercial Driver License Act, or whose license has been
revoked, suspended, cancelled, or denied under this chapter.

Effective May 5, 2003.

Approved March 15, 2003.

UT LEGIS 72
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END OF DOCUMENT
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(Defendant's counsel has procured copies of the magnetic taped records of the two prior
proceedings conducted in the Orem City Department and the Spanish Fork City
Department of the Fourth District Court in which Defendant's previous pleas were taken.
The recordings were previously made available to State's counsel and will continue to be
available to the State on request. Defendant will file certified records of such proceedings
if either record is disputed by the State or if otherwise so ordered by this Court.)
The following discourse took place at Mr. Powell's hearing in the Orem City
Department of the Fourth Judicial District Court ("Orem City Court") on December 12,
1996, before the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, Judge, Case No. 965008568:
Court:

I'll call Orem v. Rex Powell. What's this?

Unknown:

unintelligible

Court:

May I have your correct name?

Mr. Powell:

Rex D. Powell

Court:

What you have in front of you Rex is the information in
which Orem City has charged you with a Class B
misdemeanor count of driving under the influence. A class B
misdemeanor is an offense punishable with maximums up to
one thousand dollars and six months. DUIs have minimums of
at least two days for a first offense, ten days if there are one or
more, at least one conviction in the last six years, 30 days if
there are two or more. City charges that this occurred on or
about November 23. They're alleging that you committed this
offense by driving a vehicle at a time when you were under

the influence of any kind of intoxicants or combination to the
degree that you could not safely drive, or that you drove at a
time when you had a blood or breath alcohol of point zero
eight or more. Do you understand?
Mr. Powell:

Yes.

Court:

You know the difference between pleading guilty and not
guilty as I've tried to explain?

Mr. Powell:

Yes.

Court:

You ready to offer your plea?

Mr. Powell:

Not guilty.

The court then appointed counsel for Mr. Powell and instructed Mr. Powell to
meet with the public defender while the court addressed other matters. A short time later,
the court returned to Mr. Powell's case and the following discourse occurred.

Court:

Is Rex eligible?

Defense:

Yes, your Honor.

Court:

He's already arraigned. Do I remember that Rex did arraign
and offered a plea of not guilty?

Defense:

Um. Yes.

Court:

I've made the appointment, how do you want to proceed?

Defense:

I think he'd like to change his plea to guilty your Honor.

Court:

Is that your intention Rex?

Mr. Powell:

Yeah.

Court:

May I?

Prosecutor:

Yes your Honor. We drafted this . . . (unintelligible). . .
evidence of alcohol use .. . (unintelligible) . . . showed
impairment, which led to sobriety testing and arrest. He gave
a .275 intoxilyzer sample.

Court:

Wow, I've accepted your plea. I don't know how you could
see the speed at two-seventy, at two-seventy-five Rex.

After accepting the plea, the court proceeded to sentencing and explained that Mr.
Powell needed to go to Adult Probation and Parole. The court instructed Mr. Powell to
sign a promise to appear for February 28, 1997, for review of sentence.
The tape received form the Spanish Fork Department of the Fourth Judicial
District Court ("Spanish Fork City Court") revealed the following discourse concerning
Mr. Powell's hearing before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani on February 4, 1999,
Case No. 995300016.
Prosecution:

Go back to the pre-trial on Rex Powell. We're ready on that.

Court:

Spanish Fork City v. Rex D. Powell.

Prosecution:

It's my understanding that Mr. Powell will change his plea on
counts one, and three. On his doing so, the State will move to
dismiss counts two and four, and then, ah, his count on is a
Class A and we will be asking for referral to A P and P in this
matter.

Court:

OK, Miss Lindsay.

Ms. Lindsay:

That's correct your Honor. I've spoken with, ah, Mr. Powell
and I believe he understands his rights and will be waiving
them .. . (unintelligible).

Court:

OK. Mr. Powell then as to count one, driving under the
influence of alcohol and driving with a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater, a class B
misdemeanor, on or about December twenty-eight in Spanish
Fork City, what is your plea?

Mr. Powell:

Guilty.

Court:

And as to count three, driving on revocation a class B
misdemeanor on the same date what is your plea?

Mr. Powell:

Guilty.

Court:

Factual Basis.

Prosecution:

Your Honor, the date in question, ah Harry Palmer was ah, on
the freeway they were within the small area of the freeway in
Spanish Fork observed a car drift to the right side of the
highway went back in its lane, went again to the right side.
His traffic stop on the vehicle, Mr. Powell was the driver of
that vehicle. There was a strong odor of alcohol, ah his field
tests were done quite poorly. Ah I believe that he gave
intoxilyzer. Not sure, I don't know what the result is.

Ms. Lindsay:

One point, point one eight one, I think, results if I read

correctly.
Let's see if I can find that clip. It was a fairly high, high
rating. I don't see it right off but one eight would be in the
neighborhood of what it was your Honor. He also has two
priors within the period which makes this a Class A and his
driving record is revoked for alcohol offenses, and although
this is his third within the period, this is something like his
eight or ninth overall. Mr. Powell has a serious alcohol
problem. Because of that, we would ask that the maximum
term be stayed and referred for a pre-sentence report with A P
and P. He also indicates that he's hired an applicable program
which, ah I think we should try and accommodate. He's also
been held on bail, he's been in jail for probably about thirtyfive or forty-days now. Is that about right?
Thirty seven.
Ah, in light of that, in order for him to get to A P and P I
wouldn't be opposed to his release from jail with the, he
either report to A P and P.
There is a warrant, apparently still on the file that we hope
once this is cleared, that they'll get it down there too.
Get it resolved.
I think it's a nuisance matter.

Court:

Well the city dismisses count two and four for the record?

Prosecution:

Yes.

Court:

OK, is that correct, the factual basis for these?

Ms. Lindsay:

Yes your Honor,

Court:

OK. Well I have no problem with releasing Mr. Powell today,
but you are to immediately report to A P and P to get this presentence report. Initiate this immediately. How long do these
usually take?

Prosecution:

They take about six weeks.

Ms. Lindsay:

They do. I would inform Rex that if he has trouble clearing
the warrant that he's to give me a call and I will contact A P
and P and have them make contact with him in jail.

Court:

And ah, lets do that, I'll set this for sentencing about for
March sometime. Let's have sentencing on March fifteenth.
Ten o'clock.

Neither Court's record for these two previous prosecutions includes Mr. Powell's
affidavit outlining or waiving his constitutional rights, explaining the elements of the
offenses to which he was pleading, the applicable plea agreements, the potential penalties,
right of appeal is limited, or verifying the voluntariness of his pleas.

